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Summary 
The purpose of this study is to examine the bid-price variability in construction 
tenders and the project variables that would give rise to variability. This topic is 
interesting because the bid-price variability reflects market inefficiency and business 
strategies. 
An efficient market results in small fluctuations around an equilibrium price. 
The equilibrium price is fair for both the client and contractor. Large price variability 
reflects a high level of inefficiency in the market. Thus, the intent of this study is to 
determine the key project variables that give rise to the bid-price variability in the Sri 
Lankan construction industry. 
The research is designed as a regression model. An information survey was 
conducted among contractors and consultants in February – May 2004 to obtain the 
data on bids from 64 projects. Of these, data from 62 projects were usable in the 
regression model.  
The study finds that bid prices follow a symmetrical bell-shaped distribution 
with few high-end outliers. This shows a higher randomness of bids than general 
perception. The average variability measured by the coefficient of variation is 
approximately 16%. These findings highlight the possible existence of large winner’s 
curses in the Sri Lankan construction industry. 
The current literature reveals six project variables that can affect the bid-price 
variability. The analysis shows that only three projects variables have significant 
impact on variability. These are quality of tender documents, level of prequalification 
requirements, and level of minimum grading requirement. The tendering method, the 
 vii
number of bidders for a project, and the bid duration have no influence on the 
bid-price variability. 
The findings suggest that the quality of the tender documents and high levels 
of prequalification are major sources of bid-price variability. Steps should be taken to 
improve the information content of tender documents and less stringent but 
appropriate prequalification criteria should be used. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine bid-price variability in construction tenders 
and the project variables that give rise to variability in the Sri Lankan construction 
industry. This topic is interesting because bid-price variability reflects market 
inefficiency. This is because bid prices are partly based on information available to 
bidders, and partly on business strategy. These two aspects are interrelated since 
business strategies are formulated on the basis of information. 
1.1 Background 
Tendering is the most common method of price discovery in construction project 
procurement. Most construction clients favour competitive bidding (Murdoch and 
Hughes, 1992; Dawood, 1994; Holt et al., 1995). It is believed that competitive 
bidding gives the client value for money through free and fair competition (Trickey, 
1982; Lingard and Hughes, 1998). Contracts are usually awarded to the lowest bidder 
(Merna and Smith, 1990). Awarding the contract to the lowest bidder is usually 
practised in the public sector particularly because of its greater accountability (Rankin 
et al., 1996; Turner, 1979). Many private clients also award contracts to the lowest 
bidder for cost reasons. Therefore, the lowest bidder is typically the price setter. 
The lowest bid may come from a firm that badly under-estimates the cost of 
the project (McCaffer and Pettitt, 1976). There is evidence that large winner’s curses 
exist in construction (Dyer and Kagel, 1996). Hence, some contracts carry losses to 
contractors. This is detrimental for the industry for at least two reasons. First, some 
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firms may become insolvent or they could abandon the contract (Holt et al., 1995). 
Second, firms may adopt illegitimate survival strategies. They may divert funds from 
other projects, make numerous claims to receive extra payments, or breach the 
contract.  
A low price is not always favourable for the client, either. The lowest price is 
not the most competitive price when it is an underbid or an opportunistic bid. An 
adverse selection of a contractor generates high risk of losses to the client through 
eventual claims and disputes. In addition, it results in poor quality and time overruns 
that are again costs to the client (Ho and Liu, 2004; Lingard and Hughes, 1998; 
Kumaraswamy and Yogeswaran, 1998; Crowley and Hancher, 1995; Zack Jr., 1993). 
For example, an unwarranted delay in completion postpones the time of return of 
investment.  
An efficient market results in small fluctuations around an equilibrium price 
(Varian, 1993; Quayle et al., 1994). The equilibrium price is considered to be “fair” 
for both the client and contractor. From this informational perspective, large price 
variability reflects a high level of inefficiency in the market, and both parties tend to 
incur high transaction costs to discover prices. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate 
the causes of the price variability in construction projects. Although the construction 
industry is often labelled as “competitive” in the sense that there are a large number of 
buyers and sellers, it may not be efficient in the information sense. Imperfect 
information leads to departures from equilibrium as well as market failure. The two 
well-known problems are adverse selection and moral hazard. The former leads to 
risky contractors bidding for projects, and the latter can lead to contractors who may 
be less careful after contracts have been awarded, on the grounds that some form of 
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insurance has been provided.  
Historically, the factors that affect bid pricing are identified through empirical 
methods such as opinion surveys. These methods lack theoretical bases. As a result, a 
relatively large number of factors are put forward as variables that affect pricing 
decisions (Liu and Ling, 2005; Wanous et al., 2000; Fayek, 1998; Sash, 1993; Ahmad 
and Minkarah, 1988). For example, in two distinct studies, Wanous et al. (2000) 
found 38 factors, while Fayek (1998) reported 93 factors that affect tender pricing 
decisions in the construction industry. All these factors cannot be the basis for price 
decisions. Indeed, these factors may have been considered by bidders in differing 
combinations and weights, and in different contexts. For example, factors that are 
important during a recession may not as important when tenders are carried out during 
a boom. Further, small and large firms may have different considerations when 
bidding for construction work. 
In the well-known “bidding theory” in Construction Economics, it is assumed 
that a bid is based on an estimated cost plus a mark-up, and success is determined by a 
fixed probability distribution of competitors’ bids (Friedman, 1956; Gates, 1960; Park, 
1979; Park and Chapin, 1992). The mark-up fluctuates in tenders with the business 
cycle and also depends on factors such as the size of the project and the structure of 
the industry. During the recession, construction contracts are limited and firms tend to 
reduce their mark-ups. Conversely, during a boom, contractors tend to raise their 
mark-ups. Mark-ups as a percentage tend to be lower for larger projects because of 
the bigger absolute dollar value. 
The bid-price variability in the Singapore construction industry has previously 
been studied by Goh (1992), Betts and Brown (1992), and Li and Low (1986). There 
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were many studies done in Europe, USA and Middle East (Gates, 1967; McCaffer and 
Pettitt, 1976; Beeston, 1983; Ahmad and Minkarah, 1988; Park and Chapin, 1992; 
Drew and Skitmore, 1997; Rawlinson and Raftery, 1997; Holt and Proverbs, 2001; 
and Skitmore and Lo, 2002). An extensive study in a less developed country (LDC) 
such as Sri Lanka is interesting because the construction market is likely to be less 
efficient than that of developed countries. Thus, bid-price variability is likely to be 
higher. In addition, since bid-price variability may reflect perceived project risk, large 
variations are detrimental to the development of the construction industry. By 
studying the project variables that affect such perceived risks, it is hoped that efforts 
may be made to reduce project risks and allow both owners and contractors to better 
manage their projects.  
1.2 Research problem 
The construction industry requires an efficient market where risk is well managed and 
resources are efficiently allocated for its growth. The sources of bid-price variability 
in Sri Lankan construction industry are not yet studied. An extensive study on 
bid-price variability is interesting because bid-price variability reflects market 
inefficiency. 
Market inefficiency is largely a result of information and cost inefficiencies. 
Numerous factors with economic, political, social and technological roots contribute 
to these sources. Some project variables such as the quality of tender documents and 
bid duration may also contribute to market inefficiency. This study focuses on such 
project variables primarily because for industry stakeholders, these variables are far 
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easier to control than socio-political factors.  
1.3 Objectives 
The objectives of this study are: 
• To understand the general distribution of bid prices in the Sri Lankan 
construction industry as an indicator of market inefficiency as well as 
perceived risk, and 
• To determine the key project variables that give rise to bid-price variability. 
Understanding the general characteristics of the bid distribution is an essential first 
step in interpreting the relationships between bid-price variability and project 
variables. Therefore, it is a prerequisite and complementary to the second objective 
which is the main purpose of this study. Unlike descriptive studies, there is no attempt 
to develop a long shopping list of factors. Hence, only the key project variables are of 
concern in this study. 
1.4 Scope of research 
As aforementioned, the study focuses on discerning key project variables that cause 
bid-price variability. Economic, political, and social variables, while undoubtedly 
important, are excluded because of their complex relationships with bid-price 
variability and difficulties in measuring their impacts. Industry and firm level 
variables such as the number of firms in the industry and business strategies are also 
considered exogenous and are not explicitly analysed in this study. This is because it 
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is not easy to quantify strategic behaviour or attribute project-level bid variability to 
industry level influences. 
 The study is based on the Sri Lankan construction industry and projects 
tendered in 2003 and the first quarter of 2004. All types of projects are considered, 
including residential, commercial, and infrastructural projects. No attempt is made to 
categorise projects by type on the assumption that information inefficiencies are fairly 
generic. To be sure, there are some differences in bidding behaviour across project 
types, but analyzing bid-price variability in each project type differently would result 
in very small samples. 
1.5 Organisation of the report 
Chapter 1 gives the introduction. Chapter 2 presents a three-part literature review. The 
first part reviews measures of bid-price variability. The second part explores the early 
descriptive studies in bid-price variability. In the last part, key project variables that 
can affect bid-price variability are reviewed. The chapter concludes with a research 
hypothesis. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology. It starts with a brief 
background to the Sri Lankan construction industry to facilitate understanding of the 
research methodology. A regression model is selected to study the relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables. The chapter then delineates the 
adopted sampling method based on stratified sampling on a sample of 62 projects, the 
methods of data collection based on interviews and project document study, and data 
processing. 
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The data is analysed in Chapter 4. The general distribution of bid prices is first 
studied using descriptive statistics. This is followed by a regression analysis of the 
data and examination of the residuals for departures against normality and other 
ordinary least squares assumptions. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the work and presents the contributions and 
practical implications. It concludes the study with key recommendations for 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter first reviews the measures of bid-price distribution and some of the 
descriptive studies in construction bid-price distribution. It then reviews the causes of 
bid-price variability and concludes with a research hypothesis. 
2.1 Bid price distribution 
2.1.1 Measures of bid distribution 
Measures of bid price distribution include the bid price range, the inter-quartile range, 
the standard deviation of the price distribution, the variance of the price distribution, 
the coefficient of variation of the price distribution and the winning-margin (Beeston, 
1983; Dahlby and West, 1986; Park and Chaplin, 1992). They differ by the level of 
emphasis given to the two key characteristics of the distribution: dispersion and 
central tendency. 
2.1.1.1 Bid price range 
Bid price range is defined as the difference between the lowest and the highest bid. 
For the purpose of mathematical representation, a project with n bids sorted in 
ascending order as 1210 ,...,,, −nPPPP  is assumed. Then, the bid price range is given by 
(2.1) 01 PPR n −= −  
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where R is the statistical range, 1−nP  is the highest bid and 0P  is the lowest bid. The 
bid price range (R) is a useful measure to visualize the variability of bid prices for a 
proposed construction project. To compare the bid-price variability of projects of 









r n . 
It may be seen that the range is defined using only the lowest and highest values. It 
disregards the rest of the bids (and hence not a “sufficient statistic”) and an extreme 
bid (either very high or very low) can distort the “real” distribution of bids (Beeston, 
1983). Therefore, the bid price range is not used as a measure of price distribution in 
most studies. It is also not used in this study. 
2.1.1.2 Inter-quartile range 
The inter-quartile range (IQR) is the difference between the scores of the third 
quartile and the first quartile. A quartile is one of the four divisions of observations 
which have been grouped into four equal-sized sets based on their statistical rank. The 
quartile including the top statistically ranked members is called the first quartile and 
denoted as Q1. The other quartiles are similarly denoted as Q2, Q3, and Q4. The inter-
quartile range is defined as 
(2.3) 13 QQIQR −= . 
IQR is not susceptible to the impact of extreme values. Therefore, it addresses the 
limitation found in using the bid price range. However, it uses only the rank and 
quartile scores rather than each individual score and therefore does not fully utilise the 
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information in the sample. It is therefore not a sufficient statistic. 
2.1.1.3 Standard deviation and variance 













where n is the number of bids, iP  is the i
th bid and P  is the mean bid. The sample in 
our context is the bids for the proposed project. Unlike the inter-quartile range, s2 uses 
all the price information in the sample and is therefore a sufficient statistic. However, 
the measure is less appropriate in comparing the bid price distributions of projects that 
differ in size because it is an absolute value. 
2.1.1.4 Coefficient of Variation 
The coefficient of variation takes into account both the dispersion and the size of 






where CV is the coefficient of variation, s is the standard deviation of the bid prices of 
the project and P  is the average bid of the project. An undefined CV does not occur 
in Equation (2.5) as the mean bid is not equal to zero. Therefore, the coefficient of 
variation is an appropriate measure of the variability of bid prices that takes both 
dispersion and the project size into account. 
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2.1.1.5  Winning margin 
The “winning-margin” (λ) is the difference between the lowest and second lowest 
bids. The “percentage winning-margin” (γ) is the ratio of λ to the lowest bid. These 
can be mathematically represented by 









where P0 is the lowest bid and P1 is the second lowest bid. The winning-margin is a 
popular measure of bid-price variability. Since contracts are typically awarded to the 
lowest bidder, the winning-margin is a useful measure of the level of competition in 
the local construction industry. 
Some scholars define the winning-margin as the “spread” (Park and Chaplin, 
1992), “bid-spread” or the “money left on the table” (Gates, 1960). Nonetheless, the 
term “spread” has been used in a different context by Rawlinson and Raftery (1997) 
to explain the difference between any two bids of concern (in contrast to only the 
lowest and the second lowest bids). The term “spread” has also been used to represent 
the difference between the lowest and highest bid, the lowest and mean bid, and the 
lowest and second lowest bids. In order to avoid confusion, this study uses the term 
winning-margin throughout. 
2.1.1.6 Winner’s curse 
The winning-margin (λ) is often referred to as the “winner’s curse” (Thaler, 1992). 
The winner’s curse story begins with Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971). They 
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claimed that oil companies had suffered unexpected low rates of return in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s on Outer Continental Shelf lease sales. They argue that these low rates of 
return resulted from the fact that winning bidders ignore the information on 
consequences of winning. That is, bidders naively based their bids on the 
unconditional expected value of the item (their own estimates of value) which, 
although correct on average, ignores the fact that you only win when your estimate 
happens to be the highest of those who are competing for the item. But winning 
against a number of rivals following similar bidding strategies implies that your 
estimate is an overestimate of the value of the lease conditional on the event of 
winning. Unless this effect is accounted for in formulating a bidding strategy, it will 
result in winning a contract that produces below normal or even negative profits. The 
systematic failure to account for this adverse effect is commonly referred to as 
winner’s curse: you win, you lose money, and you curse (Kagel and Levin, 2002). 
The reason why some researchers use the term “winner’s curse” in the place 
of winning-margin is that it is obviously a “forgone profit” as the winner could have 
bid one dollar less than the second lowest bid and still won the contract. This is why 
sealed bids are typically used in construction projects so that bidders do not have 
access to how competitors will bid for the project. Such an arrangement benefits the 
client. For instance, if there are three bidders (A, B and C) and their reserved bids are 
$10.0m, $11.0m, and $12.0m respectively, then contractor A would bid $10.9m in an 
open bidding system (assuming bids are in decrements of $0.1m) compared to $10m 




2.1.2 Studies of bids distribution 
2.1.2.1 Early Studies 
Early studies that model bid price distributions are based on learning experience. 
These bidding models are used as decision support tools by contractors to determine 
bid prices. The first model was introduced by Friedman (1956) and further developed 
by Gates (1967). They both asserted that the probability of winning a tender can be 
roughly estimated from previous bidding encounters. Such models are based primarily 
on mark-ups; the higher the level of mark-up, the lower is the probability of success. 
Firms learn about the elasticity of this empirical relationship through their bidding 
experience.  
 Since mark-ups depend on many factors and vary with the business cycle, it is 
difficult to develop a stable relationship between mark-ups and the probability of 
winning a contract. Thus, these early models are limited in their usefulness, and are 
no longer used.  
2.1.2.2 Skewed distribution attributed to errors in bids 
One of the earliest studies that focused on the distribution of construction bids is the 
work by McCaffer and Pettitt (1976). They tested the bid distribution from a sample 
of 535 public works (roads and buildings) contracts and concluded that they are 
normally distributed. 
Skitmore et al. (2001) found that outliers were responsible for a positively 
skewed bid distribution. This is because bidders who want to win the tender estimate 
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carefully and bid low. Their bids tend to be close to each other, resulting in a skewed 
distribution (Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1 Normal and skewed distribution of bid prices 
Beeston (1983) suggested that estimation errors are the major cause of bid-price 
deviations. A skewed distribution implies estimating errors are relatively low for most 
bidders since there are few outliers. Chapman et al. (2000) also emphasised the 
impact of uncertainty of cost estimates in bids. Kaka and Price (1993) also suggested 
that bidders would arrive at different prices for the same project due to estimation 
errors. Lange and Mills (1979) referred to “ever present” mistakes. However, van Der 
Muelen and Money (1984) likened tendering to a game of darts, suggesting random 
distribution of estimation errors, and Gates (1977) called it “the game of the greater 
fool” (see Runeson and Skitmore, 1999). Since the “greater fool” is the one who 
stands to lose most, this implies a winning bid is erroneous, a costly mistake that 
makes the winner a fool. 
While these arguments may not be plausible rational propositions, they all 










types of errors, namely 
• random errors, 
• systematic errors, and 
• blunders. 
The literature does not clearly pinpoint the types of errors found in 
construction bids. However, a combination of these three types in varying degrees can 
be expected to exist. 
Random errors are statistical in nature and occur with certain probability. They 
occur due to chance variation in the process. Many studies in various disciplines such 
as engineering, business and economics assume that random errors are normally 
distributed. This assumption has empirical as well as statistical bases. It is well known 
that the sum of variables is likely to be normally distributed even if each variable is 
not a normal variate. It is also theoretically advantageous to assume that errors are 
normally distributed so that they can be modelled statistically. 
Systematic errors are unusually unintended biases in basic prices and in the 
schedule of rates that lead to estimated values being consistently too high or too low. 
However, experienced construction firms tend to have smaller biases than newer firms 
as they learn from previous tenders. Unlike physical measurements, systematic biases 
in tender estimates cannot be calibrated with high precision because there is no such 
thing as the “true” bid. The winning bid is merely the bid that wins the contract. It is 
neither true nor false. 
A blunder is typically attributable to faulty perception, misinterpretation of 
tender documents, arithmetic mistakes, carelessness, poor communication among 
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estimators, and shortcuts (Thomas, 1991). Unlike random and systematic errors, 
blunders can be quite large such as having the incorrect decimal point in rates or 
quantities. 
2.1.2.3 Pricing problems 
Apart from errors, bid-price variability may also be caused by different mark-ups for 
the rate of profit. In theory, the percentage of mark-up varies with the business cycle, 
level of competition, and business strategy. During a downturn when tenders are 
scarce and competition is fierce, mark-ups tend to be lower. Conversely, during a 
boom, firms tend to raise their mark-ups. In some industries, the level of mark-up is 
used to penetrate new markets, limit the entry of new competitors (by using low 
mark-ups), establish price leadership in cartels or monopolies, and weed out weak 
competitors that do not have staying power (McAleese, 2001). However, predatory 
pricing can only be a short-term strategy; in the long run, a firm must pay attention to 
its rate of profit. 
2.1.2.4 Empirical studies 
Several studies report variability in tender bids in different markets (Table 2.1). In 
general, the price variability in Singapore seems to be larger than that of the UK and 





Table 2.1 Empirical studies on CV and percentage winning margin 
Country CV Percentage 
winning margin 
Type of work Author 
US, UK 5-9% - Most types Beeson (1983) 
UK - 6% Industrial refurbishment 
projects 
Teo (1990) 
Singapore 2-25% 4% Public industrial projects Goh (1992) 
Singapore - 12% Public sector projects Betts and 
Brown (1992) 
 
2.2 Causes of bid-price variability 
As aforementioned, the variability in bid prices has largely been attributed to errors 
and pricing strategies in the construction literature. Several other factors need to be 
considered, and these are discussed below. 
2.2.1 Cost differences 
If firms have different cost structures, bid prices will vary even with the same level of 
mark-up. Cost or productivity differences may arise from economies of scale and 
learning economies. 
2.2.1.1 Economies of scale 
Economies of scale occur when unit cost falls as output increases, that is, at different 
levels of output. This is the familiar U-shaped average cost curve depicted in standard 
neoclassical economics textbooks (Binger and Hoffman, 1998). The construction of 
mass public housing in many countries is an example of perceived economies of scale 
in housing construction. For small projects, economies of scale are less likely to occur. 
However, as the project size gets too large, diseconomies of scale sets in. These 
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diseconomies are due primarily to increasing cost of inputs and greater complexity of 
organization and project management. 
2.2.1.2 Learning economies 
Learning economies arise when firms become more efficient at the same level of 
output and technology because of accumulated experience. A simple example is using 
word-processing software where a person becomes more proficient over time through 
learning. Learning by doing was first reported by Wright (1936) in his study of 
airframe production. Since then, such learning economies have been widely 
documented in many industries (Arrow, 1962; Yelle, 1979; Argote and Epple 1990; 
Bahk and Gort, 1993; Al-Mutawa, 1996).  
However, Tan and Elias (2000) found that learning by doing was minimal in 
the Singapore construction industry. This is attributed to the temporary nature of 
construction projects and the team nature of production where each individual is a 
specialist, making learning difficult. There are also many institutional constraints to 
learning such as immigration laws that forbid foreign workers from working for more 
than a number of years. The cyclical nature of the building industry also impedes 
learning; during a recession, many construction workers leave the industry and never 
to return when the boom gets underway.  
For this study, two project variables were used to capture cost differences. 
They are: 
• minimum grading requirement (G); and 
• level of prequalification requirement (H). 
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The minimum grading requirement (G) is a regulatory screen to ensure that 
contractors are able to carry out the work. It is a proxy for project size and, hence, 
scale economies.  
The application of prequalification requirements H (in addition to the grading 
requirement) is to assess the experience of a potential contractor in projects of similar 
nature. Thus, it captures the learning economies of bidders. 
2.2.2 Inefficient Information 
As discussed in 2.1.2 (b), the bid-price variability can largely be attributed to errors in 
bids. If arithmetic errors are set aside, inefficiency of information becomes the key 
source of errors in bids. In a construction tender, a bidder requires two types of 
information, namely, 
• information on proposed project, and 
• information on market for the proposed project. 
2.2.2.1 Information on proposed project 
The major portion of the information on the proposed project is provided by the client 
through tender documents. A complete tender document includes 
• Instruction for bidders, 
• Form of contract, 
• Bill of quantities, 
• General and supplementary conditions, 
• Drawings, 
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• Specifications, and 
• Addenda (if any). 
Any additional information required is obtained through site visits, pre-tender 
meetings, direct enquiries, and sometimes through informal networks.  
The existence of imperfections and asymmetries in this information can cause 
variability in both estimates and mark-ups. For example, the information in Bills of 
Quantities, drawings, and specifications may contradict or are unclear. This provides 
avenues for misinterpretation and, consciously or unconsciously, variable pricing. 
2.2.2.2 Information on market for the proposed project 
The information on the market is basically the pricing information, and is generally 
not specific to the project. A bidder needs information on the business cycles, level of 
competition, and business strategies of other bidders to decide on his own mark-up. 
Firms have access to publicly available information on the general construction 
market. They also maintain their own set of private information about the market. 
This information is developed through in-house analysis or obtained from external 
sources. 
In this study, the level of the information inefficiency is represented by two 
project variables. They are 
• quality of tender documents (Q), and 
• bid duration (D). 
The variable Q captures to what extent the project information is imperfect, and the 
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level of information asymmetry between client and bidders.  
The bid duration (D) is the time given for bidders to work their bids out. Bid 
duration limits the time available for bidders to search for additional information and 
analyse the available information.  
None of the two variables capture the effect of insider information being 
available to any bidder. Insider information is not publicly available, and they create 
information asymmetries among bidders. The leaking of insider information is 
difficult to trace, and this explains the paucity of work in this area.  
2.2.3 Risk    
Differences in mark-ups may also be attributed to differing risk perceptions on the 
part of bidders. It is well known that, when confronted with risks, individuals may not 
be rational (in the sense of making consistent choices) because of uncertainties 
surrounding the outcome (Tversky and Kahneman, 1987). 
 However, even if individuals are consistent, construction projects are saddled 
with many risks including (Cappen et al., 1971; Dey et al., 1994; Charoenngam and 
Chien-Yuan, 1998): 
• market risk; 
• financial risk; 
• technical risk; 
• acts-of-God  (accidents); 
• payment risk; 
• legal risks; 
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• labour disputes; and 
• societal and political risks. 
These risks are briefly discussed below. 
2.2.3.1 Market risk 
Market risk refers to changes or shifts in demand and supply that result in a project 
being scaled down or abandoned either because prices have fallen or demand has 
fallen. 
2.2.3.2 Financial risk 
Financial risks refer primarily to movements in interest rates and exchange rates. 
Changing interest rates affect the cost of capital as well as inflationary expectations 
that affect work effort because of money illusion, i.e., the perception of changes in 
real wages (Lucas, 1972). Non-price terms are just as important and they include 
items such as escrow accounts, terms of loans, origination fees, prepayment penalties, 
and price indexing of the principal. The inability to raise funds and cover debt service 
(from operating income) may also plague contractors, as are unreasonable retention. 
2.2.3.3 Technical risk 
Technical risks refer to construction related risks. A shift from an originally perceived 
scope of work affects the costs of inputs because of changes in methods and plan of 
work. Technical risks are partially predictable. For example, incomplete tender 
drawings warn about late drawings and instructions during the post-contract period. 
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Nevertheless, some risks such as unexpected subsoil conditions, shortage of quality 
material and design defects may not be unpredictable. 
2.2.3.4 Acts-of-God risks 
Acts-of-God risks refer to instances of uncontrollable natural forces such as floods, 
earthquakes, and disease. Accidents at sites may also be attributed to Acts-of-God and 
affect construction costs through disruption and physical damage. 
2.2.3.5 Payment risk 
Payment risks refer to both delay and decline of due payments. These occur due to 
change order negotiations, delay in dispute resolution, or default of client. Insolvency 
of either party to contract is also a risk in this category. A declined payment carries a 
direct loss to contractor, while a delay in payment affects cash flow. As contracting is 
largely a cash flow business, any disruption in cash flow can have serious cost 
implications. 
2.2.3.6 Legal risks 
In a construction project, the main legal risk arises from contractual problems such as 
defects, liability, payment, and dispute resolution. Apart from uncertainties pertaining 
to enforcement, legal risks also arise from uncertainties in existing legislation and 
unanticipated new legislation. 
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2.2.3.7 Labour disputes 
Labour disputes, such as strikes and other union actions hinder the performance of 
work. The risks involved are disruption and sometimes physical damages, and they 
add to cost.  
2.2.3.8 Societal and political risks 
Pressure from society such as demands for environmental protection and other 
regulatory requirements can stall a project. Public disorders such as riots and armed 
struggles also have negative impacts on work efforts. 
 Political risks arise from the actions of the State and politicians. This may 
include arbitrary confiscation, corruption, and not honouring agreements entered into 
by the previous government. 
Different perceptions of risks and responses cause variability in prices. A 
bidder who is risk-averse tends to bid a higher value than what is desirable so that he 
does not get the contract at a low offer. A risk-loving bidder is likely to bid lower to 
increase the chances of winning the contract. Finally, the risk-neutral bidder is 
indifferent about the outcome in a fair bet. 
In this study, the quality of tender documents (Q) is used as a measure of 
project risk and contractual documents are tools for managing risk. In other words, 
only legal, financial, and technical risks are captured. 
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2.2.4 Competition 
Differences in the mark-up may also be a result of differences in the nature of 
competition. In neoclassical economics, competition is studied in terms of market 
structure, that is, the number of firms in the industry. This is related to the number of 
bidders for a project (N) as well as the tendering method (M) which limits the number 
of bidders to a pre-selected list of contractors. M is a dummy variable which measures 
if tenders are “open” or “selective”. Open tenders are open to any contractor who 
becomes eligible to bid for the project under the prevailing standards and regulations 
in the industry. Selective tenders are not open to public; only a selected list of 
contractors is invited for bidding. These contractors are usually pre-selected due to 
client’s preference or their track records. 
 Baumol (1982) has argued that even if there are few firms in the industry, the 
threat of potential competition of new firms may be sufficient to keep existing firms 
from slacking. In other words, markets are “contested” and, for this reason, the 
number of competitors may not be an adequate measure of the level of competition or 
an explanation of variability on bid prices. This, of course, is an empirical question 
which this study hopes to unravel. 
 From a Marxian perspective (Marx, 1859), the level of competition is not 
limited to the number of firms as well. Firms compete in various forms such as in the 
materials input market, labour market, financial market, and internationally. The 
Porter’s (1990) diamond is also a model of competitive analysis based on competitors, 
suppliers, customers, and other stakeholders. 
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2.3 Hypothesis 
From the literature review, two statistical measures (CV and percentage winning-
margin (γ) were identified to characterize the bid-price variability of construction 
tenders. Six project variables were selected as potential sources of bid-price 
variability (Figure 2.2). They are 
G, the minimum grading required (ICTAD), 
N, the number of bidders, 
Q, the quality of tender documents, 
D, the bid duration, 
M, the tendering method (open/pre-qualify), and 




Figure 2.2 Hypothesis 
Only a firm with a higher grading (recall that G = 1 is the highest grade) can tender 
for larger projects. Therefore, the bid-price variability should become relatively 
smaller for larger projects (i.e. for smaller values for G). Since larger N represents 
Bid price variability;










( ? ) 
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higher competition, a negative relationship between dependent variable and N is 
expected. As the quality of tender documents (Q) rises, the bid-price variability is 
likely to fall because the information available for bidders becomes efficient. Bid 
Duration (D) limits the time available for bidders to search for additional information 
and analyse the information available. Therefore, lower D would lead to higher 
bid-price variability. Tendering method (M) is a dummy variable to capture if the 
tenders are open or selective. If the bidders are pre-selected, the competition is low 
and bid-price variability tends to be high. Similarly, a higher level of H reduces the 
level of competition and would give rise to bid-price variability. On the other hand, a 
high H would qualify only the contractors with greater experience. Since, experience 
reduces the pricing errors; it would result in low variability in prices. Thus, it is stated 
that the theoretical direction of H is unknown. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the research methodology. Some background on the Sri Lankan 
construction industry is required to fully understand the research design. 
Consequently, the background is first presented, and this is followed by an outline of 
the research methodology used in this study. 
3.1 Background 
3.1.1 The Sri Lankan political, economic and social landscape 
Sri Lanka is a republic. The legal system is based on a complex mixture of English 
common-law and Roman-Dutch, Kandyan (in central region), Thesawalamai (in 
north), Muslim, and customary law. 
3.1.1.1 Political history 
The island was ruled by a strong native dynasty from the 12th century, but was 
successively dominated by the Portuguese, Dutch, and British from the 16th century 
and finally annexed by the British in 1815. A Commonwealth State since 1948, the 
country became an independent republic in 1972.  
Sri Lanka has a multiparty democracy. The United National Party (UNP) 
elected in 1977 governed the country for 17 years. In 1978, a major constitutional 
amendment was introduced by UNP to create an executive presidency. The executive 
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president, elected for six-year term, is the Chief of State, Head of Government, and 
Commander-in-Chief for the armed forces. The legislative body is a unicameral 225-
member Parliament. In 1985, R. Premadasa became the Prime Minister of the first 
executive President J. R. Jayewardene’s cabinet. In 1989, R. Premadasa became the 
next president but fell a victim of a separatist suicide bomber in 1993. A coalition, the 
Peoples’ Alliance (PA), led by the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), won 
the next presidential and parliament elections in 1994. In 2001, the United National 
Front (UNF, a UNP-led coalition) won the majority of parliamentary seats. Chandrika 
Kumaratunga remains as President. This result of having the Prime Minister and 
President from opposing parties led to political strains. This came to a head in 2004 
when the President dissolved the UNP parliament. SLFP and Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP), also known as the People’s Liberation Front (a Marxist group), 
formed the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA). UPFA was able to form a new 
government after the subsequent parliamentary election. 
3.1.1.2 Ethnic conflict 
Since independence, the Tamil minority has been uneasy with the country's unitary 
form of government. By the mid-1970s, Tamil politicians were moving from support 
for federalism to a demand for a separate Tamil State. 
In 1983, the death of 13 Sinhalese soldiers at the hands of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, a separatists group) unleashed the largest outburst of 
communal violence in the country's history. The north and east became the scene of 
bloodshed as security forces attempted to suppress the LTTE and other militant 
groups. Terrorist incidents occurred in Colombo and other cities. Bombings directed 
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against politicians and civilians were common. The conflict continued until 2001 
amid a few unsuccessful attempts to negotiate for peace. In December 2001, the 
newly elected UNP government and the LTTE declared unilateral cease-fires and 
jointly agreed on a cease-fire accord in February 2002. Both parties continue to 
observe it at the time of writing. 
3.1.1.3 Economy 
The key natural resources in the island are limestone, graphite, mineral sands, gems, 
and phosphate. Textiles and garments, food and beverages, insurance and banking, 
and telecommunications are the largest sectors in the economy. The largest export 
market is United States, and was US$ 1.8 billion in 2003 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 
2005). The leading suppliers to the country are India, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan and South Korea. 
Since achieving political autonomy, the development strategies of Sri Lanka 
have swayed between socialist and capitalist ideals. Prior to 1978, the State assumed 
the central role in allocating resources and steering the economic development of the 
country (Lakshman, 1997). Sri Lanka is highly dependent on foreign assistance; in 
2003, a total of US$4.5 billion has been pledged for Sri Lanka in an aid conference in 
Tokyo. 
Since 1978, the country has been steadily opening up to market forces. The 
State encourages private sector investment in developing commercial infrastructure 
facilities such as port services, electricity and telecommunication projects, highways, 
and industrial towns (ICTAD and Choy, 2004). Several economic reforms also took 
place and, as a result, Sri Lanka managed to achieve an average real GDP growth 
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rate of about 5% over 1991-2003. During this period, inflation grew by about 9% per 
year (Figure 3.1). Overall, real economic growth managed to lower the unemployment 
rate to about 8% in the early 2000s. 
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Figure 3.1 Colombo Consumers' Price Index 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics (2005) 
Table 3.1 provides data on external trade and finance. The current account balance 
has been negative and narrowing. Over the same period, the exchange rate has 
depreciated substantially against the US dollar. 
Table 3.1 External Trade and Finance 




 Terms of trade -12.5 -5.0 -6.1 -1.7 4.6 7.4
  
Export unit value index 
(1997 = 100) 
9.1 -8.5 1.5 -5.2 -4.1 5.5
  
Import unit value index 
(1997 = 100) 
24.7 -3.5 8.1 -3.6 -8.3 -1.8
EXTERNAL FINANCE (US$m)    
 Current account balance  -377 -563 -1,066 -215 -237 -101
 
Current account balance 
(per cent of GDP)  
-4.7 -3.6 -6.4 -1.4 -1.4 -0.6
EXCHANGE RATES    
  Rs./US$ (Annual average)  40.06 70.39 75.78 89.36 95.66 96.52
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2005) 
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3.1.1.4  Social Landscape 
The current population of Sri Lanka is about 19.4 million and it grows by about 1.3% 
per year. The population density is highest in the southwest where Colombo, the 
country's main port and industrial centre, is located. Sri Lanka is ethnically, 
linguistically, and religiously diverse.  
Sinhalese make up 74% of the population and are concentrated in south, west, 
and central parts of the country. Ceylon Tamils, citizens whose South Indian ancestors 
have lived on the island for centuries, total about 12% and live predominantly in the 
north and east. Indian Tamils represent about 5% of the population. The British 
brought them to Sri Lanka in the 19th century as tea and rubber plantation workers, 
and they remain concentrated in and around the tea plantations in south-central Sri 
Lanka. Muslims (both Moors and Malays) make up about 7% of the population. 
Burghers who are descendants of European colonists (principally from the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and aboriginal Veddahs constitute the 
remaining 1% (Department of Census and Statistics, 2005). 
Most Sinhalese are Buddhists, and most Tamils are Hindus. The majority of 
Sri Lanka's Muslims practise Sunni Islam. Sizable minorities of both Sinhalese and 
Tamils are Christians, most of whom are Roman Catholic. 
Sinhala, the native language of Sinhalese, and Tamil are official languages of 
the country. The use of English has decline since independence, but it continues to be 
spoken by the middle and upper classes, particularly in Colombo. Many private 
organizations such as banks use English as the working language. The government is 
seeking to promote the use of English, mainly for economic reasons. 
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Education is compulsory up to age of 14 years. A 96.5% of school attendance 
is recorded in this age group in year 2003 (Department of Census and Statistics, 2005). 
The country’s literacy rate is 91% and is the highest compared to other LDCs in South 
Asia. The life expectancy is 71 years for males, and 76 years for females. 
3.1.2 The construction industry of Sri Lanka 
3.1.2.1 Construction output 
The construction sector contributed about 7% to GDP and approximately 50 - 55% of 
gross domestic capital formation over the past decade. The sector has been 





















Figure 3.2 Construction output (US$m) 
Source: Compiled from Department of Census and Statistics (2005), and Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2005). 
In 2003, the construction output was approximately US$ 4.6 billion. The growth 




















Figure 3.3 Construction output growth 
Source: Compiled from Department of Census and Statistics (2005), and Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2005). 
3.1.2.2 Work force 
In 2003, the direct employment of construction workers was around 290,000 or 4.4% 
of the total employment of the country. About 97% are male workers. If the labour 
force in the building materials industry and building maintenance works are included, 
the construction industry employs approximately 10% of the total workforce of the 
country (Ganesan, 2000). 
The education system is efficient in producing professional, technical, and 
skilled workforce to cater to industry needs. There are three universities producing 
about 900 engineering graduates per year (est. 2004). More than half of these 
graduates are qualified to work in construction and related fields (such as mechanical 
and electrical works). About 250 of them are specialized in Civil Engineering. In 
addition, the University of Moratuwa produces 50 Architecture and 50 Quantity 
Surveying graduates per year. The university also offers a National Diploma in 
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Technology, a three-year full time programme, adding about 100 skilled technical 
staff to the construction industry. Another equally skilled 120 is added to this by the 
Technicians Training Institute managed by the National Apprentice and Industrial 
Training Authority (NAITA). There are 37 technical colleges island-wide that enrol 
about 13,000 (est. 2002) students per year. There are many other public and private 
institutes producing qualified workers for the construction industry (Department of 
Census and Statistics, 2005; Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2005). 
Thus, Sri Lanka has a highly skilled construction labour force. However, their 
availability for the local construction industry is sometimes limited by the heightened 
overseas demand, particularly from the Middle East. Therefore, the industry faces a 
shortage of skilled labour, especially during booms. 
As shown in Figure 3.4, nominal wages have risen by about two to three times 































Figure 3.4 Labour wages. 
Source: ICTAD and Choy (2004). 
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3.1.2.3  Construction cost 
Although construction costs have roughly doubled over the last decade (Figure 3.5), it 
has actually declined in real terms. As we have seen, real wages have remained 
largely constant while worker skills have improved. Consequently, productivity has 































Figure 3.5 Construction cost index 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics (2005). 
 
The cost of energy (Figure 3.6) has continued to rise faster than the Colombo CPI 
(compare with Figure 3.1) largely because Sri Lanka is a net energy importer, 
particularly oil. Apart from cost, hydroelectric power faces intermittent disruption and 
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Figure 3.6 CCPI for Energy 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics (2005) 
3.1.2.4 Capital 
The norm for mobilization advance payment equals to 30% of the contract sum. 
Under the standard conditions of contract, a contractor is entitled for the payment of 
20% upon submission of performance bond and a work programme on how the 
advance payment is utilized. Another two payments of 5% each will follow in 
subsequent months. The repayment begins only after the contractor’s monthly claim 
exceeds 30% of contract sum (ICTAD, 2002). The amounts are deducted from each 
monthly payment proportionately. This practice minimizes the contractors’ capital 
requirement to start a new project. Since the repayment is also on monthly basis, the 
capital is not a major problem provided payments are made on time and in full. 
Progress payment delays are not uncommon. 
Almost all medium and large contractors utilize bank overdraft facility when 
necessary. The maximum limit and interest rate vary with the reputation of contractor 
with the bank. Over the past five years, interest rates on overdrafts tend to vary 
between 6 to 36%. Small contractors usually obtain mortgage loans from banks for 
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their capital requirements. Figure 3.7 shows that there has not been a significant 
change in interest charged on mortgage loans in recent years. As aforementioned, the 
capital required for a contractor in Sri Lanka is comparatively lower than other 






















Figure 3.7 Commercial bank mortgage rates 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2005) 
The State-owned Private Sector Infrastructure Development Company (PSIDC) 
provides long-term loans to clients for infrastructure projects. PSIDC supplements the 
usual commercial sources for financing large projects. PSIDC loans can fund up to 40 
per cent of the total project cost and loan maturity is decided on a case-by-case basis 
for up to 22 years. Sri Lanka has a fully developed commercial banking system 
consisting of about 26 commercial banks. Two of the large commercial banks, which 
have an extensive network of branches in all parts of Sri Lanka, are public banks. In 
addition, there are four private local banks. All foreign commercial banks in Sri 
Lanka have operational services in Colombo. 
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3.1.2.5 Materials 
Building materials account for 50% to 60% of the total cost of a building. Materials 
from smaller industries constitute an important share of this expenditure. With the 
growth of construction industry, the production of construction materials has 
increased significantly in recent times (Ganesan, 2000).  
 The building materials industry in Sri Lanka suffers from several problems 
including 
• lack of adequate production, 
• high cost of production and transport, and 
• poor quality of materials. 
In particular, the price of sand has increased sharply over the last few years (see 
Figure 3.8).   
























Figure 3.8 Building material cost indices 
Source: ICTAD (2004) 
 40
3.1.2.6 Structure of the industry 
The Sri Lankan construction industry is characterised by a large number of small 
firms and a small number of large firms. According to the revised national registration 
and grading system for contractors, the total number of registered main contractors by 
end of 2003 was 1620 (in all grades: M1 – M10). 
Table 3.2 shows the number of registered contractors in each grade from M1 
to M6 and the maximum value of single contract they may be awarded. Grades are 
given to contractors according to ability and fields of speciality to ensure that they do 
not undertake jobs beyond their capabilities. 
Table 3.2 ICTAD Registered contractors  







US$  ‘000 
M1 20 300 3,045 
M2 17 150 1,523 
M3 33 50 508 
M4 68 20 203 
M5 123 10 102 
M6 186 5 51 
Source: ICTAD (2003) 
3.1.2.7 Institutions 
Institutions refer to the organisations, rules and practices that exist in the industry. 




In 1981, the government established Construction Industry Training Project (CITP), 
which was subsequently renamed the Institute of Construction Training and 
Development (ICTAD) in 1986. ICTAD is the central authority on construction 
industry operations in Sri Lanka. Its emphasis has shifted from producer to facilitator 
and it is now involved in several facets such as industry development, registration of 
contractors and consultants, and development of conditions and other standards for 
the industry (Jayawardena and Gunawardena, 1998). 
NCCASL 
The National Construction Contractors Association of Sri Lanka (NCCASL) is the 
only association of contractors recognized by the State. Currently, it has over 2000 
members. Some small contractors registered with NCCASL are not registered under 
ICTAD. 
Other organisations 
As mentioned earlier, PSIDC was established in 1995 to provide long-term loans to 
sponsors of infrastructure projects. 
There are many other institutes setting standards, promoting construction 
sector development, and conducting research while acting as large clients to the 
construction industry. Examples include the Urban Development Authority (UDA), 
Road Development Authority (RDA), Buildings Department, and Ceylon Electricity 
Board (CEB). 
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Rules and practices 
The Sri Lankan construction industry follows most of the British standards and 
guidelines. Although there are number of options available, only the conventional 
Standard Method of Measurement is used to prepare and price the Bills of Quantities 
(BQs). Even with contracts that do not demand the presence of a BQ (e.g. turn-key 
and design and build contracts), an internal BQ is prepared for management of work 
(Kodikara and McCaffer, 1993). 
Most projects follow the traditional procurement method, while 
design-and-build (D&B) contracts have also gained popularity. With the State 
incentives for infrastructure development projects, non-traditional procurement 
methods such as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Build-Own-Operate (BOO) are 
also becoming popular. 
Project managers are slowly replacing architects as the leader of the project 
team in Sri Lanka. Increasingly, modern techniques of management are applied to 
meet stringent deadlines within budget. 
The contractor is entitled to claim for 80% of value of materials on site in 
addition to his work done in his monthly claim. Under the general conditions of 
contract, the maximum duration is 30 days to receive the payment after the 
submission of a duly prepared claim. 
The claim procedure for variations is similar to other international standards 
such as the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) and the Institute 
of Civil Engineers (ICE). In the event of disagreement of valuation of such variations, 
the consultant shall fix a price as in his opinion, is reasonable and proper. This is 
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stated in the contract. 
Nominated sub-contractors are common for medium and large projects. Usually, 
sub-contractors for mechanical, air-conditioning, electrical, and glazing are nominated 
by clients. 
3.2 Research design 
The study is based on a regression model. This design is chosen because the objective 
of the study is to establish the relationship between bid-price variability and project 
variables. Figure 3.9 maps out the research methodology. 
 
Figure 3.9 Research methodology 
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diagram. Instead, it flows through several sections which comprehensively discuss the 
research design and how it was put into practice. 
3.3 Sampling 
3.3.1 Population 
The sampling population is all construction projects in Sri Lanka which were tendered 
between 2003 and 2004 Q1, and categorised M6 or above. The reasons for choosing 
the above periods are: 
• There was no significant change in commercial bank lending rates during this 
period, and 
• Interviewees felt that it would be difficult to provide satisfactory information 
on projects tendered more than one year ago. 
Limiting the category to M6 and above sets the smallest project to be included in the 
sample to be larger than 5 million Sri Lankan Rupees (approximately SGD 0.08 
million). Project categories below M6 are too small to provide reliable estimates of 
the relationships between bid-price variability and the independent variables. This is 
because sufficient information from such projects is difficult to obtain or is 
unavailable. 
3.3.2 Sampling frame 
A sampling frame is not used in this study because information on construction 
projects is difficult to obtain. Therefore, any project with accessible information is 
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selected for the sample. However, bias is reduced by having a large number of 
projects from various firms. 
3.3.3 Sampling method and responses 
Projects are classified under three categories based on size. The minimum grading 
requirement is used as the base for this categorisation as illustrated in Table 3.3. The 
largest contract into which a contractor in each category shall enter was given in 
Table 3.2 earlier in this chapter. The contract limit and minimum grading requirement 
differ in definition and application. The highest contract sum is limited for the 
contractor by the registered grading while a minimum grading requirement for 
eligible bidders is specified by the client at the time of calling for bids.  
Table 3.3 Project size category according to the minimum grading requirement 
Project size category Grading Number of projects Percentage 
Large M1 & M2 10 16 
Medium M3 & M4 31 50 
Small M5 & M6 21 34 
  62 100 
Since the minimum grading requirement is set based on the Engineer’s Estimate (EE) 
or the client’s budget, it is appropriate as a measure of the project size. A stratified 
sample based on Table 3.3 is used to minimize the probability of obtaining a sample 
biased towards one or two project size categories. It can be seen that there are 
relatively fewer large projects in the sample of 62 projects. A total of 73 projects were 
initially targeted but only 62 projects had sufficient information to allow estimation 
using regression analysis. For the descriptive analysis, data from 64 projects were 
usable because only the dependent variable needs to be analyzed. 
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3.3.4 Sample size 
It can be seen from Table 3.3 that the sample size was 62, and this is deemed to be 
sufficient for a regression analysis with six independent variables. 
3.4 Variables 
From the literature review, six project variables are possible sources of price 
variability. From interviews with industry professionals, 14 additional variables were 
identified. The variables are discussed below. 
3.4.1 Minimum ICTAD grading required (G) 
The National Registration and Grading of Contractors in Sri Lanka is implemented by 
ICTAD. A grading is awarded to a contractor on the basis of the capacity to carry out 
construction work. The grading is expressed as M1, M2, M3, and so on from the 
largest to the smallest graded firm. The same grading is used by clients when calling 
for tenders. The minimum grading requirement (G) is determined by the client based 
on his own estimate for the proposed project, and is given in the tender notice or 
invitation to tender. The numerical figure is used in the regression analysis model. 
Therefore, smaller values for G represent larger projects.  
3.4.2 Number of bidders (N) 
The number of bidders (N) is the total number of contractors competing for a project. 
Therefore, N is measured from number of tender documents issued. The number of 
bids submitted sometimes misrepresents the competition when some contractors do 
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not submit their bids. It is assumed that contractors who obtain tender documents 
intend to bid and are therefore potential competitors based on our discussion on 
contestable markets. In the sample, there are only three cases where the number of 
tender packages issued does not tally with the number of bids received. 
3.4.3 Quality of tender documents (Q) 
The quality of tender documents (Q) refers to the completeness and clarity of the 
information provided in tender documents. A typical tender package consists of 
(Clough and Sears, 1994): 
• Instruction to Bidders, 
• Form of Contract, 
• Bills of Quantities, 
• General and Supplementary Conditions, 
• Drawings, 
• Specifications, and 
• Addenda. 
The instructions to bidders provide guidelines on the bidding procedure and 
interpretation of the tender documents. The form of contract is the specimen of the 
agreement to be signed if the contract is awarded. This has to be included in the 
tender documents so that the bidders can understand their possible post-contract 
commitments. 
The bills of quantities (BQ) provide the detailed work to be carried out in the 
project. It includes all permanent work and a significant part of temporary work. The 
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first section of BQ is the preliminaries, where most of the temporary works are given. 
It also includes other costs to the contractor such as insurance costs, costs of bonds 
and guarantees, and costs of obtaining clearance from various authorities. The units 
and methods of measurement follow accepted standards. Work items are described so 
that it is clearly understood. Preamble notes are given where necessary. The general 
conditions of a contract set forth the manner and procedures whereby the provisions 
of the contract are to be implemented according to the accepted practices in the 
construction industry.  
The drawings relate to the architectural, structural, mechanical, electrical, and 
civil aspects of the project. They show the arrangements, dimensions, construction 
details, materials, and other information necessary for estimating and construction. A 
high quality set of tender drawings is complete, intelligible, accurate, and integrated. 
Specifications are written instructions concerning the project requirements. The 
specifications are statements concerning the technical requirements of the project such 
as materials, workmanship and operating characteristics. 
A tender document complete with all above is regarded as of high quality. An 
example of a poor quality document is one with only an architectural sketch and a BQ 
with missing critical dimensions. 
The quality of tender documents (Q) is measured on a scale from 0 to 5 where 
5 represents high quality and 0 represents very poor quality. The rating is given by the 
author, and it is based on careful examination of the actual tender documents by the 
author together with contractors’ quantity surveyors. The opinions of these quantity 
surveyors help to reduce the subjectivity of the ratings. Generally, there are few 
disagreements as the author is also a quantity surveyor and both parties adhere to a list 
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of criteria for assessing the quality of tender documents in a systematic way. The 
entire tender package (that is, Instruction to Bidders, Form of Contract, Bills of 
Quantities, General and Supplementary Conditions, Drawings, Specifications, and 
Addenda) is assessed. It is relatively easy for an experienced quantity surveyor to 
determine the quality of tender documents. In many cases, documents of poor quality 
tend to have obvious discrepancies between drawings and BQs, and specifications 
tend to deviate from industry standard established by ICTAD. 
3.4.4 Bid duration (D) 
The duration given for bidders to prepare their bids is measured in weeks. This is 
calculated from the difference between the date of tender document issuance and bid 
closing date. 
3.4.5 Tendering method (M) 
There are two methods of tendering: open and selective. Any registered construction 
company can bid in open tenders. In the selective tendering process, firms are short-
listed and only a limited number is invited to bid. This characteristic is measured as a 
dummy variable with M = 0 for open tenders, and M = 1 for selective tenders. 
3.4.6 Level of prequalification requirements (H) 
The level of prequalification requirements is based on track records, financial and 
capital resources, and expertise. H is measured in a three-point ordinal scale: low, 
medium, and high.  
 50
Each rating was made by a few senior professionals such as quantity surveyors 
and engineers who participated in the specific tender, and the rating was obtained 
through an interview. The rating was given relative to the size of the project. For an 
example, M3 project was rated relative to an average M3 contractor. Generally, a 
rating is based on track record and capital resources. A high rating was given if 
extensive track records were stipulated and, as a result, only a few contractors were 
short-listed in a selective tender. In open tenders, prequalification requirements set 
down on tender documents were considered for rating. If nothing was specified, a 
“low” rating was given. 
Assigned codes rather than two dummy variables were used in the regression 
model so as not to reduce the degrees of freedom (Tan, 2004). Although the use of 
assigned codes implies equal increments, this disadvantage is not serious given that 
these ratings were based on professional opinions and contain some elements of 
subjectivity. 
3.4.7 Other variables 
In addition to the six project variables above that are likely to affect bid prices, 
14 other variables were suggested by professionals during the interview (Table 3.4). 
These variables were first correlated with the dependent variable (CV) and, if the 
correlations are high, they will be included in the regression model. This step is 
necessary because the degrees of freedom will be low if these 14 variables are initially 
included in the regression model.  
Of the 14 variables, only the first variable, the level of new technology 
required (NT), is based on the ordinal scale. It contains some level of subjectivity 
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because what is “new technology” lacks common understanding. The measures for 
the other 13 variables are relatively straightforward. 
The likely impact of each variable on CV is given in the last column of Table 
3.4. A positive sign indicates that the variable is likely to lead to higher bid prices, 
and a negative sign indicates the reverse. A question mark indicates that the direction 
of impact is unclear. 
Table 3.4 Additional independent variables 
Independent 
variable 
Description Measure(s) Impact on 
bid prices 
NT Level of new technology 
required 
Ordinal: No, low, medium, 
and high. 
(0, 1, 2, 3) 
+ 
CLT Type of client Public (= 1) or 
private client (= 0) 
+ 
TDep Tender deposit Value of non-refundable 
deposit in Rs. ( '000) 
Minimal 
BB Bid bond Value of bid bond 
Rs. (Million) 
+ 
PB Performance bond Percentage of  
contract sum 
+ 
MIns Minimum 3rd party 
insurance 
In Rs. (Million) + 
MMC Minimum monthly claim In Rs. (Million) ? 
CnT Type of contract ICTAD standard; 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
- 





MP Maintenance period In months + 
LDD Liquated damages per day As a percentage of contract 
sum 
+ 
LDL Liquated damages limit As a percentage of contract 
sum 
+ 
PFl Provision for price 
fluctuation 
Allowed = 1 
Not allowed = 0 
- 
CI Building cost index As publish by the ICTAD for 






3.5 Methods of data collection 
All field data necessary for the study were collected in Sri Lanka. The survey took 
three months (February – April 2004) during which both the interviews and data 
collection were carried out. 
3.5.1 Interviews 
In-depth interviews with experienced professionals were conducted to help to identify 
the 14 additional variables discussed above, and to discern the practicality of 
measures selected for all 20 variables. Seven Sri Lankan professionals experienced in 
bidding were interviewed. The first interviewee was the chairman of a leading 
quantity surveying firm in Sri Lanka. Being involved in many academic and policy 
making activities as well, he had an excellent insight of the Sri Lankan construction 
industry. This was instrumental in having a second interview with him after 
interviewing six others. The second interviewee was a director of a consultant firm 
and the third was the manager (contracts) in a grade M1 construction firm. They both 
were keen on excelling themselves as experts in the field and hence seemed to follow 
academic literature and conducted some (mostly in-house) research. The fourth 
interviewee was a director in a consultant firm while having his own construction 
company. The fifth was a senior quantity surveyor in a M1 construction firm and the 
sixth interviewee was the chief quantity surveyor of a M2 construction firm. They 
both were responsible for the bidding process in respective firms. A lecturer in a 
leading university teaching project procurement was the seventh interviewee. As such, 
the interviewees were chosen to obtain a balanced input from a wider perspective. 
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The interviews were semi-structured and generally followed the following 
steps: 
• Screening on the suitability and background of the interviewee; 
• Brief self-introduction; 
• A brief explanation of the aims and objectives of the study; 
• A question on the key project variables that can cause variability in bid-prices; 
• A discussion on variables that were not mentioned by the interviewee; and 
• A question on practicality of measures proposed to measure each variable. 
The questions did not strictly follow the aforementioned order, and variations 
inevitably occurred. (See Appendix A for sample questions.) Semi-structured 
interviews gave enough flexibility to make the interviewee express views clearly. 
There was a second round of informal interviews to gather additional data as required. 
3.5.2 Project information 
Project information was extracted primarily from project documents. The data were 
entered into a data collection form (see Appendix B) to ensure that they were 
complete. The form was structured under three main parts: 
• General project information, 
• Variables, and 
• Bid prices. 
General project information consisted of the name of the project, location of the 
project, date of bid opening, date of project start, names of client, contractor, and 
consultants, and so on. Variables were subdivided into project variables, contractor 
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variables, client variables and tender variables. Bid prices from various contractors 
bidding for the project were also collected. 
3.6 Data collection and processing 
3.6.1 Data collection 
Data were collected from February – April 2004 in the offices of the firms discussed 
earlier in the sampling section. Most of these firms were located in Colombo. 
Apart from the data collection form, a tape recorder was kept on standby but 
was hardly used as the interviewees preferred that the interviews were not recorded. 
3.6.2 Data processing 
Bid prices of all projects were tabulated as given in Table 3.5. There were 62 projects 
(i.e. n = 62) and number of bidders for each project (m) varied from two to sixteen. 
The computed means ( P ), standard deviations (s), coefficients of variation 
(CV), winning-margins (λ) and percentage winning-margins (γ) were then transferred 
to Table 3.6. The table also contains data on the independent variables (Xk). 
shows all the 20 independent variables. Variables selected for regression 





Table 3.5 Bid prices of different projects 
Bid Number Project1 Project2 … Projecti … Projectn 
1 P1,1 P2,1 … Pi,1 … Pn,1 
2 P1,2 P2,2 … Pi,2 … Pn,2 
3 P1,3 P2,3 … Pi,3 … Pn,3 
… … … … … … … 
j P1,j P2,j … Pi,j … Pn,j 
… … … … … … … 
m P1,m P2,m … Pi,m … Pn,m 
Mean 
1P  2P  … iP  … nP  
Standard deviation s1 S2 … si … sn 
Coefficient of variation CV1 CV2 … CVi … CVn 
Winning-margin λ1 λ2 … λi … λn 
% Winning-margin γ1 γ2 … γi … γn 
 . 
 
Table 3.6 Project variables 
Project No. P  s CV λ γ X1 X2 X3 … Xk … 
1 
1P  s1 CV1 λ1 γ1 X1,1 X2,1 X3,1 … Xk,1 … 
2 
2P  s2 CV2 λ2 γ2 X1,2 X2,2 X3,2 … Xk,2 … 
… … … … … … … … … … … … 
i 
iP  si CVi λi γi X1,i X2,i X3,i … Xk,i … 
… … … … … … … … … … … … 
n 








Table 3.7 Independent Variables (Xk) 
variable Description 
G Minimum ICTAD Grading requirement 
M Tendering method 
N Number of competitors 
Q Quality of tender documents 
D Tender duration  
H Level of prequalification requirements 
NT Level of new technology required 
CLT Type of client 
TDep Tender deposit 
BB Bid bond 
PB Performance bond 
MIns Minimum third-party insurance 
MMC Minimum monthly claim 
CnT Type of contract 
NSB Nominated subcontractors’ work 
MP Maintenance period 
LDD Liquated damages per day 
LDL Liquated damages limit 
PFl Provision for price fluctuation 







CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1 Descriptive data analysis 
4.1.1 Standard deviation and mean of bid prices 
It is of interest to know how bid prices vary with project size proxied by mean bids. 
All projects were analysed to identify the best fit curve under the following plausible 
models:  
Linear model:  )(10 Ps ββ +=  
Quadratic model: ( )2210 PPs βββ ++=  
Cubic model:  ( ) ( )332210 PPPs ββββ +++=  
Power model:  10
ββ Ps =  
Table 4.1 Curve-fit results 
Model R2 F Sigf β0 β1 β2 β3 
Linear 0.54 73.08 0.000 2.120 0.087  
Quadric 0.62 50.45 0.000 -1.111 0.174 -0.000 
Cubic 0.63 34.22 0.000 0.182 0.118 0.000 -0.000
Power 0.68 129.29 0.000 0.180 0.865  
The power model gives the highest R2, and it is given by  
(4.1) ( ) 865.018.0ˆ Ps =   
This model was derived from 
(4.2) ( ) )(ln865.0712.1)ˆln( 076.0 Ps ±+−= . 
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However, β1 was found to be not significantly different from 1. Under H0:  β1 = 1, the 
test statistic was 
( ) 7763.1076.01865.0 −=−=t . 
The critical t value at 5% level of significance for 62 degrees of freedom is 1.960 and 
therefore H0 was not rejected. From (4.1), this implies 
(4.3) Pks =ˆ  
where k is a constant. Thus, the standard deviation is proportional to the mean bid or 
project size.  
The result is not unexpected since variability is likely to increase with project 
size. As a project becomes more complex, information becomes increasingly 
imperfect, business strategy also becomes more variable, and there are fewer 
competitors.  
4.1.2 General distribution of bids 
The major obstacle in modelling the general distribution of bids was that there were 
not enough bids in any given project to produce a sensible probability distribution. 
The number of bids per project varied from two to sixteen. Figure 4.1 provides a 
simple illustration of this limitation. It shows the histograms for two projects having 
15 and 12 bids respectively. The distributions appear erratic, and frequencies for 




Figure 4.1 Histograms of bid prices 
As a result, it is necessary to merge the raw data for all projects. Since raw prices 
varied substantially across projects, normalization was required. 
If standard scores were used, the required transformation for the jth bid in ith 







−=   
where Pij is the original bid price, iP is the mean bid-price and si is the standard 
deviation of bids. The Z score is distributed with zero mean and unit standard 
deviation. This is undesirable because the standard deviation is fixed at unity.  
A better option is to normalize using the following transformation (Beeston, 
1983): 
(4.5) %)100)(( ,, ijiji PPP =′ . 
















Std. Dev. = 0.32797
N = 15













Std. Dev. = 6.47814
N = 12
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If g(.) and f(.) represent densities, then 
(4.6) ( ) ( ) JPPfPg jiji ,, =′  
where J is the Jacobian of the transformation. From (4.5), J = 1/100 so that the 
transformation scales the density ( )PPf /  by a factor of 1/100. The important point is 
that the skewness is not affected. In general, if y is a function of x, then  
(4.7) Jxfyg )()( =  
where J = abs(dx/dy) and abs(.) refers to absolute value. A density function cannot 
assume negative values.  
All normalized prices ( jiP ,′ ) were pooled together to obtain a single sample 
with sample size n = 389. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.2 and the 
distribution is plotted in Figure 4.2. The distribution is only slightly skewed but has a 
high peak (kurtosis). 
Table 4.2 Standardised bid prices: Descriptive Statistics 
 Statistic Standard 
Error 
N – sample size 389  
Mean 100 0.8180 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean  
Lower Bound 98.3544  
 Upper Bound 101.5710  
5% Trimmed Mean 99.4325  
Median 99.3925  
Variance 260.3010  
Std. Deviation 16.1338  
Minimum 52.4437  
Maximum 206.4810  
Range 154.0373  
Interquartile Range 14.7761  
Skewness 1.1790 0.124 
Kurtosis 6.5540 0.247 
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Figure 4.2 Standardized Prices Histogram 
Various tests (Table 4.3) were conducted to test for normality. The significant levels 
were lower than 0.05. From the normal Q-Q plot (Figure 4.3), it can also be 
concluded that the distribution of bid-prices is not normal. 
Table 4.3 Standardised Prices: Tests for Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
0.102 389 0.000 0.920 389 0.000 



























Normal Q-Q Plot of Standardized Prices
 
Figure 4.3 Normal Q-Q Plot of Standardized Prices 
 






Since 100=P , 
  sCV =   
Therefore, the coefficient of variation for all construction bids in the sample is 16.134. 
This value is generally higher than that found in previous studies conducted in the US, 
UK and Singapore (see Section 2.1.2). This is not unexpected given that Sri Lanka is 
a developing country and markets are less efficient. 
For an in-depth analysis on the coefficient of variation, the sample was 
segregated by project size (Table 4.4, Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6). It can be seen that the 
CV is high for small projects but relatively constant for medium and large projects. 
For small projects, the standard deviation tends to be large relative to the mean, 
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resulting in relatively higher values of CV. 
 
 













Figure 4.4 Price histogram for large projects 














Figure 4.5 Price histogram for medium size projects 
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Figure 4.6 Price histogram for small projects 
Table 4.4 Bid price distribution in different project sizes 
Project Size N S = CV Skewness Kurtosis 
Large 83 13.6465 1.548 4.169 
Medium 158 13.2804 0.266 2.130 
Small 148 19.8682 1.334 6.273 
All 389 16.1338 1.179 6.554 
 
 
4.2 Analysis of correlation 
In this study, correlation analysis is used for two main purposes: 
• to identify the relationships between variables; and 
• to identify possible multicollinearity. 
 
Table 4.5 shows the correlation matrix. A bold-italic coefficient indicates that the 
correlation is significant at the 0.01 level and a bold-only coefficient indicates the 
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correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 





























































































































































(CV) Coefficient of 
Variation 1 .317 .310 -.119 .213 -.536 -.199 .292 -.018 -.107 -.200 -.244
(γ) Percentage 
winning-margin .317 1 -.029 .211 -.264 -.122 .041 .156 .065 .120 .007 -.041
(G) Minimum ICTAD 
grading .310 -.029 1 -.028 .037 -.259 -.407 -.164 .066 -.248 -.534 -.570
(M) Tendering Method -.119 .211 -.028 1 -.406 .193 -.180 -.142 .176 .631 -.096 -.118
(N) Number of 
competitors .213 -.264 .037 -.406 1 -.201 -.039 .008 -.052 -.166 .086 .006
(Q) Quality of documents -.536 -.122 -.259 .193 -.201 1 .254 -.017 .176 .154 .119 .133
(D) Tender duration 
(weeks) -.199 .041 -.407 -.180 -.039 .254 1 .121 -.115 -.197 .242 .386
(H) Prequalification 
requirements .292 .156 -.164 -.142 .008 -.017 .121 1 .269 -.067 .064 .064
(NT) New technology -.018 .065 .066 .176 -.052 .176 -.115 .269 1 .070 -.048 -.051
(CLT) Type of Client -.107 .120 -.248 .631 -.166 .154 -.197 -.067 .070 1 .170 .133
(TDep) Tender deposit 
(Rs. '000) -.200 .007 -.534 -.096 .086 .119 .242 .064 -.048 .170 1 .591
(BB) Bid Bond 
(Rs. Million) -.244 -.041 -.570 -.118 .006 .133 .386 .064 -.051 .133 .591 1
(PB) Performance Bond 
% -.076 -.071 -.310 .227 -.055 .172 -.026 .326 -.027 .392 .038 .137
(MIns) Minimum 3rd Party 
Insurance -.267 -.082 -.368 .340 -.179 .493 -.056 -.205 .115 .370 .282 .193
(MMC) Mini. Monthly 
claim (Million) -.349 -.179 -.505 .118 -.153 .444 .075 -.123 .082 .249 .309 .434
(CnT) Type of contract .150 .172 -.008 .126 -.261 -.031 .078 .190 .148 -.047 -.112 -.102




-.013 .196 -.014 .425 -.144 -.020 -.140 .100 .438 .384 .212 .182
(MP) Maintenance Period 
(Months) -.073 -.072 -.232 -.080 .118 .186 .107 -.065 .110 .079 .200 .191
(LDD) LD per day % .181 -.037 .005 -.170 -.029 .119 .085 .336 -.128 -.006 -.025 -.010
(LDL) LD Limit % -.035 -.005 .251 -.043 .057 .231 -.004 -.011 -.002 -.036 .038 .032
(PFl) Provision for Price 
Fluctuation -.034 -.106 -.309 -.277 .118 .006 .375 .056 .112 -.151 .229 .374
(CI) Building Cost Index -.213 .095 -.135 -.085 -.026 -.040 .113 -.304 -.397 .026 .248 .257
Continued to next page … 
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(CV) Coefficient of Variation -.076 -.267 -.349 .150 .167 -.013 -.073 .181 -.035 -.034 -.213 
(γ) Percentage 
winning-margin -.071 -.082 -.179 .172 .262 .196 -.072 -.037 -.005 -.106 .095 
(G) Minimum ICTAD grading -.310 -.368 -.505 -.008 -.213 -.014 -.232 .005 .251 -.309 -.135 
(M) Tendering Method .227 .340 .118 .126 -.116 .425 -.080 -.170 -.043 -.277 -.085 
(N) Number of competitors -.055 -.179 -.153 -.261 .036 -.144 .118 -.029 .057 .118 -.026 
(Q) Quality of documents .172 .493 .444 -.031 -.120 -.020 .186 .119 .231 .006 -.040 
(D) Tender duration (weeks) -.026 -.056 .075 .078 .058 -.140 .107 .085 -.004 .375 .113 
(H) Prequalification 
requirements .326 -.205 -.123 .190 .054 .100 -.065 .336 -.011 .056 -.304 
(NT) New Technology -.027 .115 .082 .148 -.026 .438 .110 -.128 -.002 .112 -.397 
(CLT) Type of Client .392 .370 .249 -.047 -.180 .384 .079 -.006 -.036 -.151 .026 
(TDep) Tender Deposit 
(Rs. '000) .038 .282 .309 -.112 -.033 .212 .200 -.025 .038 .229 .248 
(BB) Bid Bond (Rs. Million) .137 .193 .434 -.102 -.093 .182 .191 -.010 .032 .374 .257 
(PB) Performance Bond % 1 .297 .317 .383 -.145 .179 .065 .395 .022 -.034 -.038 
(MIns) Minimum 3rd Party 
Insurance .297 1 .753 -.037 -.033 .200 .092 -.099 .040 -.084 -.022 
(MMC) Mini. Monthly claim 
(Million) .317 .753 1 .058 -.088 .093 .009 -.003 .148 .057 .169 
(CnT) Type of contract .383 -.037 .058 1 .044 -.008 .135 .199 -.025 -.067 -.099 
(T) Type of procurement -.145 -.033 -.088 .044 1 -.028 -.029 -.109 -.416 -.033 .067 
(NSB) Nominated 
Sub-contractors’ work % .179 .200 .093 -.008 -.028 1 .074 -.025 .121 -.049 -.163 
(MP) Maintenance Period 
(Months) .065 .092 .009 .135 -.029 .074 1 .086 -.103 .204 -.174 
(LDD) LD per day % .395 -.099 -.003 .199 -.109 -.025 .086 1 .197 -.092 -.079 
(LDL) LD Limit % .022 .040 .148 -.025 -.416 .121 -.103 .197 1 .080 -.067 
(PFl) Provision for Price 
Fluctuation -.034 -.084 .057 -.067 -.033 -.049 .204 -.092 .080 1 -.113 
(CI) Building Cost Index -.038 -.022 .169 -.099 .067 -.163 -.174 -.079 -.067 -.113 1 
Of the additional 14 variables identified through the interviews, bid bond (BB), 
minimum third party insurance (MIns), and minimum monthly claim (MMC) showed 
significant correlations with CV. However, these three variables vary directly with 
project size. Therefore, they are proxied by the minimum grading requirement (G). 
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None of the 11 other variables showed significant correlations with CV or γ. This 
justifies the decision to drop the 14 variables from the regression model. 
Table 4.6 shows the correlations for the two dependent variables and six 
independent variables. It is a subset of Table 4.5 and it is reproduced here for 
convenience. Of the six independent variables, only tender duration (D) does not have 
a significant correlation to either of the dependent variables.  











































































































(CV) Coefficient of 
Variation 1 0.317 0.310 -0.119 0.213 -0.536 -0.199 0.292 
(γ) Percentage 
winning-margin 0.317 1 -0.029 0.211 -0.264 -0.122 0.041 0.156 
(G) Minimum ICTAD 
Grading 0.310 -0.029 1 -0.028 0.037 -0.259 -0.407 -0.164 
(M) Tendering Method -0.119 0.211 -0.028 1 -0.406 0.193 -0.180 -0.142 
(N) Number of 
competitors 0.213 -0.264 0.037 -0.406 1 -0.201 -0.039 0.008 
(Q) Quality of 
documents -0.536 -0.122 -0.259 0.193 -0.201 1 0.254 -0.017 
(D) Tender duration 
(weeks) -0.199 0.041 -0.407 -0.180 -0.039 0.254 1 0.121 
(H) Prequalification 
requirements 0.292 0.156 -0.164 -0.142 0.008 -0.017 0.121 1 
 The correlations among the independent variables are not sufficiently high to 
suggest that multicollinearity is a major problem. The highest correlation coefficient 
is only -0.407. This is not unexpected because the independent variables capture 
different types of information and are not highly correlated with each other. For 




Table 4.7 shows some basic descriptive statistics of the sample of 62 projects. For the 
dependent variables, we have seen that the distributions are not strictly normal but are 
sufficiently “normal” (see Figure 4.2) so that ordinary least squares (OLS) may be 
used and the Box-Cox (1964) transformation is not required. OLS is robust with 
respect to slight departures from normality. 
Table 4.7 Descriptive statistics of regression variables (sample size = 62) 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Dependent       
CV 13.842 9.068 0.59 45.09 1.397 2.437
γ 9.101 9.019 0.12 35.18 1.353 1.048
Independent   
G 3.89 1.427 1 6 -0.074 -0.819
N 6.37 3.234 2 16 0.862 0.464
Q 3.35 0.722 2 5 0.419 0.132
D 3.67 2.840 1 17 3.196 12.398
H 1.98 0.833 1 3 0.030 -1.561
M 0.40 0.493 0 1 0.432 -1.874
It may be seen from Figure 4.2 that there are two outliers. These outliers were not 
removed from the model because they were valid bids, and the purpose of this study is 
to examine bid variation. These two outliers were from small projects (see Figure 4.6). 
Several linear and nonlinear regression models were experimented and the 
linear model has the best fit. The estimated models are 





+−+= ,             420.02 =R . 
(4.9) ( ) N347.0818.0499.14 ±−=γ ,            069.02 =R . 
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The t-statistics are all greater than 1.96, indicating that the parameters are significant 
at the 0.05 level of significance (refer Appendix C). It can be seen that model (4.9) 
predicts relatively poorly compared to model (4.8). This is understandable because γ 
is the percentage winning-margin based on the lowest two bids. As such, it does not 
adequately capture bid-price variability. Based on the above results, the discussion 
that follows is based on model (4.8). 
 It can be seen from model (4.8) that CV is related to only three variables, 
namely, minimum grading requirement (G), quality of tender documents (Q), and 
level of prequalification requirements (H). Since a firm with a lower grading (i.e. 
larger G) can tender only for smaller projects, the positive regression coefficient is of 
correct sign, that is, CV falls with project size. The negative sign for Q is also 
expected since Q is measured from 0 to 5 (highest quality). As the quality of tender 
documents rises, bid-price variability is likely to fall. Finally, H is measured as Low, 
Medium or High prequalification requirement and is coded as 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
The theoretical direction of causality is unknown because it is an empirical question 
how CV will vary with H. A higher level of H reduces the level of competition but 
pre-qualified firms may bid in a variety of ways. Model (4.8) shows that H is 
positively related to CV. Therefore, higher levels of prequalification requirements lead 
to larger bid-price variability. 
 The adjusted R-square is 0.420. The relatively low R-square is not unexpected 
given that project information is relatively inefficient in Sri Lanka. Of the 62 projects 
used, the quality of tender documents from 39 projects was graded at or below 3 out 
of a scale of 5 (highest quality). Another reason for the relatively lower R-square 
value is that bids are also based on business strategies that are not captured by any of 
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the independent variables. This is because business strategies, by their nature, are 
qualitative and cannot be adequately measured. 
 The next step in the regression analysis analyzes the residuals for departures 
from normality. A randomly scattered distribution is found in the residual plot (Figure 
4.7), and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Table 4.8) reveals that the significant level is 
greater than 0.05. Therefore, the residuals are normally distributed. This substantiates 
the appropriateness of using ordinary least squares for this study and no 
transformation of functional form or observations to obtain randomly distributed 
residuals is required. 











Figure 4.7 Residual Plot 
Table 4.8 Test for normality of residuals 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
  Statistic df Sig. 
Residuals 0.074 62 0.200 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary 
The purpose of the study is to examine the project variables that cause bid-price 
variability in construction tenders. This study is interesting because bid-price 
variability represents the market inefficiency. This is because bid prices are partly 
based on information available to bidders, and partly on business strategy. These two 
aspects are interrelated since business strategies are formulated on the basis of 
information. 
The objectives of the study are: (1) to understand the general distribution of 
bid prices in the Sri Lankan construction industry as an indicator of market 
inefficiency, and (2) to determine the key project variables that give rise to bid-price 
variability. 
The hypothesis is that the bid-price variability, measured by the coefficient of 
variation (CV) and winning-margin (γ), is affected by the minimum grading required 
(G), number of competitors (N), quality of tender documents (Q), bid duration (D), 
tendering method (M), and level of prequalification requirements (H). A further 14 
variables were also identified through interviews with professionals and practitioners 
as possible factors that affect bid-price variability. 
The research was designed as a regression model. It was preceded by an 
exploration study (a descriptive analysis) to explain the general distribution of bid 
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prices from a sample of 64 projects. Interviews were carried out with seven Sri 
Lankan professionals with extensive experience in bidding. They comprised 
consultants, contractors and academics. Project information for the regression analysis 
was extracted primarily from project documents from 62 projects. Any additional 
information was acquired through informal interviews. 
The analysis of bid-prices showed that the standard deviation was proportional 
to the project size. The bid prices approximate a symmetrical bell shaped distribution.  
The distribution is only slightly skewed but has a high peak. The average coefficient 
of variation of all bids in the sample was about 16, and the variation was higher in 
small projects than in large and medium size projects. 
Of the additional 14 variables, only 3 showed a significant correlation to CV. 
But they were not selected for the regression model because these variables, namely, 
bid bond (BB), minimum third party insurance (MIns), and minimum monthly claim 
(MMC), were proxied by minimum grading requirement (G) in the regression model. 
The correlations among the independent variables were not significantly high 
to suggest that multicollinearity was a major problem. The regression model for 
percentage winning-margin (γ) was relatively poor in goodness of fit, and is related 
only to the number of competitors (N). The regression analysis using CV as the 
dependent variable concluded that the linear model has the best fit. Only three 
independent variables, namely, minimum grading requirement (G), quality of tender 
documents (Q), and level of pre-qualification requirements (H), were significantly 
related to CV. The R-square was 0.448, which is relatively low because of imperfect 
information and the inability of the model to “measure” the business strategies that 
also influence bids. 
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5.2 Contributions and implications 
5.2.1 Distribution of Bid Prices 
The first contribution of the study is the exploration of the general distribution of bids 
of Sri Lankan construction industry. It was found that standard deviation of bids was 
proportionate to the project size. This is not unexpected as the variability of bid prices 
is likely to increase with the complexity of a project, because information becomes 
more imperfect with increasing complexity. Other basic features of the bid 
distribution in the sample are summarized in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 General distribution of bid prices 
Measure Value Comment 
Coefficient of Variation 16.1338 High variability  
Skewness 1.1790 Slightly positive 
Kurtosis 6.5540 High peak 
The distribution is slightly positively skewed. This is due to the existence of few 
unrealistically high bids (outliers) (see Skitmore et al. (2001) for similar bid 
distribution in UK). A high kurtosis implies most bids are scattered closely around the 
average bid. The high dispersion reflects relatively high information inefficiency and 
possible existence of large winner’s curses in the Sri Lankan construction industry. 
Among different project sizes, small projects showed the highest variation in 
CV of about 20% while medium and large projects showed about 13% variability. 
This shows that the market for small contracts is more inefficient than that for 
medium and large contracts. The high variability and skewness also suggest the 
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existence of large errors in bids as indicated by Beeston (1983), Chapman et al. 
(2000), and Runeson and Skitmore (1999). 
The distribution of the bids in this sample is not normal. This differs from 
expected normal distribution as previously found by McCaffer and Pettit (1976). 
However, this is an acceptable deviation as the sample distribution is approximately 
normal. 
5.2.2 Impact of project variables on bid-price variability 
The second contribution is the establishment of relationship between bid-price 
variability and project variables. The estimated model is 





+−+= ,           420.02 =R . 
The bid-price variability (measured by CV) is related to only three variables, 
namely, minimum grading requirement (G), quality of tender documents (Q), and 
level of prequalification requirements (H). It does not have any relationship with bid 
duration (D), tendering method (M), or number of competitors (N). 
G is rated from 1 to 6, where 1 refers to largest projects. Hence, the study 
shows that bid-price variability falls with project size. This means that market for 
larger projects is relatively efficient in the informational perspective. Cost differences 
are low among large firms and they also have the advantage of scale economies. But, 
among small firms, cost differences are high because some are less experienced. 
Further, there is a high tendency for them to use predatory or risky pricing. The study 
shows that the tendering method (M) or number of bidders (competitors, N) does not 
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affect CV. Therefore, the neoclassical view of competition based on market structure, 
is found to be ineffective in altering bid-price variability.  
High levels of prequalification requirements (H) yield relatively high 
variability in bid prices. Prequalification requirements had been identified in previous 
work on pricing and mark-up decisions (Liu and Ling, 2005; Fayek, 1998; Ahmad 
and Minkarah, 1988), but a study on how it would affect bid-price variability was not 
found. Bidders with good qualifications would bid high as they are more confident 
while less confident bidders would try to compete through price alone. 
Inefficient information is the third key factor to increase bid-price variability. 
Some previous studies also have identified this affect towards contractors’ pricing 
decisions (Liu and Ling, 2005; Fayek, 1998; Ahmad and Minkarah, 1988). The 
negative sign of Q emphasizes the role of quality of tender documents in reducing the 
pricing errors and mistakes. Further, incomplete (i.e. low quality) tender documents 
carry high risk for bidders. Their mark-ups vary according to their risk attitudes. This 
also leads to high variability of prices. 
5.3 Limitations of the study 
The limitations of the study are as follows. First, bid prices from a sample of 62 
projects were pooled in the estimating procedure. This is because there are only a few 
bids in each project. This pooling necessitates a transformation of the raw bid prices 
that scales the dispersion but normalizes the mean bid to 100. This process is justified 
in terms of the objective of the study to study bid price variability; clearly, a 
transformation that scales the dispersion loses or distorts some of the original 
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information. 
 Second, the lack of sufficient previous theoretical work inhibited the clear 
identification of variables that affect bid-price variability. In this sense, this study 
contributes to current knowledge by identifying three project variables that affect bid 
price variability. 
 Third, it is difficult to measure business strategies because of their qualitative 
nature and this partly accounts for the relatively lower R-square. 
 Fourth, several dummy variables or codes were used as measures for the 
independent variables. To the extent that dummy variables capture only dichotomies 
rather than a range of values as possible outcomes, they impose a limitation on the 
study. 
Finally, the sample of 62 projects, while sufficient for the regression analysis, 
may not be representative of construction bids in Sri Lanka. 
 Despite these limitations, the descriptive statistics and regression analysis do 
provide some insight into the bidding behaviour of Sri Lankan contractors. 
Specifically, bids were approximately normally distributed and three project variables, 
namely minimum grading requirement, quality of tender documents, and level of 






Three recommendations may be made as a result of this study.  
(a) Quality of tender documents 
First, the quality of tender documents needs to be raised to improve the efficiency of 
the market. If tender documents are of poor quality, there is a higher probability of 
unrealistically low bids. Since standard forms are widely used, the main areas of 
improvement lie in production information such as drawings, specifications, 
schedules of work and quantities. 
Standardization and effective communication are the means of improving the 
quality of production information. Numerous initiatives to standardize such 
information are evident from the past. These vary from introducing common 
phraseology for BQs (Fletcher and Moore, 1979) to standard method of measurement 
(Association of Cost Engineers, 1972), and to specification writing guidelines (Marsh, 
1967). With the development of the construction industry, improved and efficient 
standards and codes became available (RICS, 1979; Willis and Willis, 1997; Seely, 
2001; Emmitt and Yeomans, 2001; Hackett and Robinson, 2003; Keily and 
McNamara, 2003; CIDB, 2004). 
In 1980s, quality assurance of production information received a wide interest. 
In the UK, the Coordinated Production Information (CPI) scheme was initiated by the 
Construction Project Information Committee (CPIC). CPIC was formed from 
representatives of the major industry institutions: Royal Institute of British Architects, 
Institution of Civil Engineers, Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers, 
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Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, and the Construction Confederation. In 
1987, CPIC published its first CPI documents comprising the following: 
• Code of Procedure for Production Drawings; 
• Code of Procedure for Project Specification; and 
• Common Arrangement of Work Sections (CAWS). 
Production drawings are drawn (graphic) information and prepared by the design 
team to be used by the construction team. The main purpose is to define the size, 
shape, location and construction of the building and its components. The spatial 
coordination and technical coordination are the most important aspects of production 
drawings. 
Specifications are the written information prepared by the design team to be 
used by the construction team. The main purpose is to define the products to be used, 
the quality of work, any performance requirements, and the conditions under which 
the work is to be executed. These should be consistent with the drawings and work 
items in Bills of Quantities. 
CAWS is the coded classification of work. In 1998, CAWS was revised. The 
new code, covering both drawings and specification, replaced the separate 1987 codes 
on production drawings and project specification. At the same time, a revised edition 
of the Standard Method of Measurement (SMM7), co-ordinated with the new CPI 
conventions, was also published (RICS, 1998). 
CAWS defines an efficient and generally acceptable arrangement for 
specifications, drawings, and bills of quantities for building projects. It consists of a 
set of detailed work section definitions within a classification framework of groups 
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and sub-groups. The same work sections are followed in specifications, drawings and 
SMM7. Thus, CAWS is a scheme for coordinating the design information that 
independent consultants produce so that it fits together as a coherent description of the 
anticipated final product (the building). This helps to ensure that design information 
produced by each consultant is consistent with that produced by all others. 
Recent developments in Information Technology (IT) and Computer Aided 
Draughting (CAD) have made it possible to build a virtual prototype of projects (i.e. 
3D models). This also enables errors, omissions and coordination problems in the 
production drawings to be identified and rectified before tendering. However, virtual 
models are still expensive and time-consuming to construct, and is unlikely to be 
widely used in the Sri Lankan construction industry in the near future. 
(b) Level of prequalification 
Second, a higher level of prequalification requirements increases the variability of 
bids because it reduces competition. Therefore, setting up unnecessarily high levels of 
prequalification is unwise. In the sample, more than a third of total projects required 
high levels of prequalification. 
 The purpose of setting prequalification requirements is to screen out the 
incapable contractors from bidding. In a less developed country, contractors may not 
have diverse experience because the number of projects of a specific nature is limited. 
For example, in a large hotel project tender, setting a requirement of experience in 
three similar projects would disqualify most of large contractors who are actually 
capable of handling the project but lack the experience because there are not many 
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such projects. Therefore, an experience-based prequalification method is not 
necessarily desirable for the Sri Lankan construction industry. 
 Several prequalification models have been developed to solve this problem. 
Table 5.2 summarises the prequalification models that have been previously studied in 
construction tendering.  
Table 5.2 Prequalification Models 
Model Author(s) 
Multi-attribute utility model Diekmann (1981) 
Fuzzy sets model Nguyen (1985) 
Statistical model Jaselskis (1988) 
Prequalification formula Russell and Skibniewski (1990a) 
Knowledge-intensive model Russell and Skibniewski (1990b) 
Dimensional weighting Jaselskis and Russell (1991) 
Dimensional-wide modelling Jaselskis and Russell (1991) 
Two-step modelling Jaselskis and Russell (1991) 
Financial model Russell (1992) 
Linear model Russell (1992) 
Hybrid model Russell (1992) 
Analytical hierarchy process (AHP) Fong and Choi (2000) 
Balanced scorecard (BSC) Johnson and Jayasena (2003) 
Historically, the prequalification assessment criteria has widened with time. This is 
because experience and financial capacities are not adequate indicators of capability. 
This suggests that the prequalification of bidders based on wider performance criteria 
is a better solution to the problem identified in this study. Since there are several 
methods available (Table 5.2), an appropriate method should be introduced to the Sri 
Lankan construction industry. 
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 These methods can be adapted from Performance Based Procurement Systems 
(PBPS). The frequently used criteria for performance evaluation of contractors are 
(Australian Procurement and Construction Council, 1998): 
• technical capability, 
• financial capacity, 
• quality management, 
• occupational health safety and rehabilitation, 
• compliance with code of practice, 
• human resource management (including skill formation), 
• commitment to client satisfaction, 
• co-operative contracting and partnering, 
• management of environmental issues, 
• management for continuous improvement, and 
• compliance with legislative requirements.  
The traditional method of prequalification also focused on few of the criteria above. 
The difference in innovative PBPS is that the evaluation is not based on experience in 
project of similar nature. It assesses the contractors from a wider performance 
spectrum. 
The latest models such as Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980) 
and Balance Scorecard (BSC) (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) have been adapted in 
contractor selection (Fong and Choi, 2000). A conceptual BSC framework that had 
been developed for the Australian construction industry (Johnson and Jayasena, 2003) 
has subsequently been shown to be applicable to the Sri Lankan construction industry 
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(Johnson, 2003, Johnson et al., 2005).  
(c) Winner’s curse 
Third, the possible existence of large winner’s curses in the Sri Lankan construction 
industry should be considered in awarding the contracts. The common practice of 
awarding the contract to the lowest bidder would be an adverse selection if the lowest 
bid is an underbid. Because of this reason, some scholars support non-lowest bid 
contractor selection (Jaselskis and Russell, 1991; Kashiwagi, 1997; Kumaraswamy 
and Walker, 1999). The considerations are that the (a) lowest price may not yield the 
value; (b) low price may not be cost-saving; and (c) price is significantly linked to the 
quality and performance. The main problem with using bid price alone is that it is 
one-dimensional and is unable to deal with the multi-dimensional aspects of a 
construction product that include not only cost but also time and quality. Thus, a 
contract that has been awarded based on price alone will leave the quality dimension 
imperfectly determined (through specifications, supervision, performance bonds, and 
so on). Vickrey (1961) has long suggested that, in one-sided sealed bid auctions, the 
contract should be awarded to the second lowest bidder to remove the winner’s curse. 
Contractors then have the incentive to “reveal” their true bids because the contract 
will not be awarded based on their bids but on the second lowest bid. Recall that the 
winner’s curse is the difference between the two lowest bids. 
The PBPS framework introduced above is a possible solution to this problem. 
However, the implementation of PBPSs is still problematic. One example is the 
National Museum of Australia project which procured under PBPS. It has been 
reported that even some leading contractors found it difficult to prove their 
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performance due to lack of evidence (Walker et al., 2001). Therefore, the change has 
to be pragmatic so that it does not burden the industry. 
 Johnson (2003) found that the Sri Lankan construction industry has the 
capacity to adapt the BSC framework. However, this is only a performance measure. 
A tender evaluation method has to be devised by coupling BSC with bid-price 
evaluation methods. 
5.5 Further Research 
A limitation of this study is that bid-price variability reflects both information 
inefficiencies and business strategies. The latter include perceptions of risk which 
leads to differences in mark-ups. This explains why the R-square is 0.448, which is 
not high. There is clearly scope for further research on how business strategies affect 
bids to complete the picture. 
An inefficient construction market leads to post-contract conflicts. Therefore, 
another interesting area would be to couple this study with studies in claims 
management and project success (Ho and Liu, 2004; Lingard and Hughes, 1998; 
Kumaraswamy and Yogeswaran, 1998; Crowley and Hancher, 1995; Zack Jr., 1993). 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW  GUIDE 
 100
The interview generally followed the following steps. 
1. Self introduction. 
2. Summary explanation of the study: key point was the intention to study which 
project variables could affect bid-price variability. Few examples were also given. 
3. Questioned; “What sort of project variables would affect bid-price variability in 
your opinion?” 
4. All his/her points were noted and compared with the current list of variables. If 
all variables in the current list were mentioned in direct or indirect terms, step 5 
was skipped. 
5. Questioned; “Other than what you’ve mentioned, some professionals I met 
pointed that X & X also affect bid-price variability, would you agree and why?” 
6. Questioned; “For my analysis I measure factor X in a scale from 0 to 5, where 0 
represents lowest quality and 5 represents the highest. This will be rated by a 
senior professional who involved in bidding for the construction project in 
concern. Do you feel this scale is practical and I will receive objective response?” 
7. Questioned; “You involved in bidding for project A. How would you rate factor 
X for that project?” 
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Prequalification requirements low medium high 
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Type of procurement (traditional, D&B, Mgt, etc)  
Completeness of documents (On scale) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
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Maintenance period (months)  
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(H) Pre Q requirements, (N) No. of competitors, (D) Tender 
duration (weeks), (Q) Quality of documents, (G) Minimum 
ICTAD Grading, (M) Tendering Method(a)
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Adjusted R 
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Std. Error of 
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B Std. Error Beta     
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  (D) Tender 
duration (weeks) .012 .358 .004 .034 .973
  (H) Pre Q 
requirements 3.377 1.095 .312 3.085 .003





Output Created 14-MAR-2005 14:47:54 
Comments   
Input Data \\g0203422\Analysis\DATA Dec 13.sav 
  Filter <none> 
  Weight <none> 
  Split File <none> 
  N of Rows in 





User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
  Cases Used Statistics are based on cases with no missing 
values for any variable used. 
Syntax REGRESSION  /MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  /NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT cv  /METHOD=ENTER ictad 
dcuments preq  . 
Resources Elapsed Time 0:00:00.09 
  Memory Required 3324 bytes 






 Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
 




(H) Pre Q requirements, (Q) 
Quality of documents, (G) 
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Model 
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Coefficients t Sig. 
Model B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 17.184 8.798  1.953 .056
  (G) Minimum 
ICTAD Grading .185 .876 .029 .212 .833
  (M) Tendering 
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  (N) No. of 
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  (Q) Quality of 
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Model 
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a  Dependent Variable: (Y) % Winning margin 
 
 
 
 
